TAO—Block—Subnets85 / 128active
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Bittensor Subnet
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# UR Subnet **Bittensor SN25 (netuid 25): a subnet for a decentralized privacy network.** This repository (`sn`) is the reference implementation of the UR Subnet — the EVM contract suite, miner and validator software, chain tooling, and the real-testnet integration harness. The operator/API implementation lives in the sibling `server` repository, which also runs provider egress probing (reachability, location, bandwidth and egress health) as recurring taskworker tasks.  **Network Operators (NOs)** run the privacy servers and sell the traffic. Independent **providers** carry ingress/egress traffic for them. Independent **validators** run the [`VALIDATOR.md`](VALIDATOR.md) routing‑verification protocol — walking server‑assigned chains of providers to prove real‑time transit and measure *which providers are the weakest links*. Bittensor's **Yuma Consensus** turns that measurement into emission. Everything is denominated in the subnet's native token — **α**, branded **$UR**. The full specification is in [`WHITEPAPER.md`](WHITEPAPER.md); the design rationale versus the rest of the Bittensor field is in [`COMPARISON.md`](COMPARISON.md). Terms are defined in the [glossary](#glossary) at the end. --- ## Mechanism at a glance  Money flows in three coupled channels, all in α. The detailed map of every contract and flow is [`diagrams/mechanism.png`](diagrams/mechanism.png). ### 1. Deposits — the demand signal, conviction stake, and a buyback  Each NO deposits α sized to its real usage for the **previous** epoch, taken from its signed usage statement (its signed payout artifact for epochs before settlement version 2), at the rate in the **signed price sheet** published at <https://ur.xyz/price.yml> (no on‑chain oracle; [`WHITEPAPER.md`](WHITEPAPER.md) §7.1). The NO stakes the α on its own deposit hotkey; its deposit signer then calls `deposit` on `STCoordinator`, which moves the exact amount into the immutable `STReserveSink`, staked on the fixed reserve hotkey. The reserve hotkey is the **owner‑validator hotkey**, set at initialize ([`WHITEPAPER.md`](WHITEPAPER.md) §15.2). The sink has **no outbound code path**, so deposits are **never distributed**: their dividends compound in place, and their stake adds to the owner validator's consensus weight. A NO's cumulative locked α (its **conviction**) sets its **tier**, and the tier sets its **rate**: zero conviction pays the baseline rate, and more conviction lowers it. The tier is snapshotted before each epoch. The deposit is audited at every steering pass: until the deposit so far this epoch equals the amount owed, that NO's pool weight is 0 on that pass, and overpaying fails too. So the NO pays as early in the epoch as it can. From the start of each priced epoch until the previous epoch's usage is committed on chain, its totals are published and the deposit has landed, the pool carries no weight. Deposits are the costly signal of real demand, and the NO is expected to fund them by buying α on the market from revenue (the buyback, §7.4). That purchase is off‑chain and not enforced: no contract or validator checks where the α came from, and a correct deposit may come from any source of α. The reference server's route for converting USDC to α is a choice of operator software, not a protocol rule. **Policy modes.** Each entry of the price sheet is signed by a key pinned in the software, and sets the rates and the per‑epoch cap from its effective epoch without changing the signed policy or its hash. With no signed entry in force, the signed policy's schedule applies: it chooses how usage is priced (`rao_per_gib` today; per‑user pricing is a schema option) and what a zero rate means. With `zero_rate_action: equal_demand`, no deposits are required or audited and every pool carries the same implied demand, so measured quality alone steers the pool channel. That is the launch mode, and a signed entry of all zero rates returns to it. The shipped testnet policy ([`deploy/testnet/policy-v2.yml`](deploy/testnet/policy-v2.yml)) is bytes‑only and halts on a zero rate. ### 2. Emission — Yuma Consensus  The Bittensor coinbase pays the standard **18% owner / 41% miner / 41% validator** α split. Each tempo (360 blocks, ~72 min), validators score **both miner tiers** from their own trails, submit one weight vector under **commit‑reveal**, and Yuma's stake‑weighted **median + clipping + vtrust** turns those scores into miner emission — so the validators' evaluation *is* what moves the money. Validator emission flows **natively** (∝ stake × vtrust), including to the stake the reserve holds. The validators' vector splits the miner share by a governance parameter **θ** (start θ = 0.3): - **Head (θ):** each top‑level fleet is weighted by its split‑adjusted count of distinct routable egress‑prefix hashes. - **Pool tail (1 − θ):** each NO's pool UID is weighted `implied_usage × clamp(Q_n, 0.75, 1.0)`, where `implied_usage` is the NO's audited usage priced at the baseline rate (exactly 1 for every pool at zero price) and a pool with `Q_n = 0` gets 0. Because the quality clamp is [0.75, 1.0], live pools differ by at most 1.33× on quality. Under zero‑price launch mode demand is equal, so the pool share is close to an even split across pools until pricing is switched on. θ only takes effect if a stake‑majority of validators runs the same θ, so it is a published governance value, not per‑validator discretion. If no head fleet exists, the θ share cedes to the pools (`empty_channel: cede_to_nonempty`). > **Mainnet